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Abstract  
Forest fires are an annual occurrence in many parts of the world forcing large-scale 
evacuation. The frequent and growing occurrence of these events makes it necessary to 
develop appropriate evacuation plans for areas that are susceptible to forest fires. The 
buildingEXODUS evacuation model has been extended to model large-scale urban 
evacuations by including the road network and open spaces (e.g. parks, green spaces 
and town squares) along with buildings. The evacuation simulation results have been 
coupled with the results of a forest fire spread model and applied to the Swinley forest 
fire which occurred in Berkshire, UK in May 2011. Four evacuation procedures 
differing in the routes taken by the pedestrians were evaluated providing key evacuation 
statistics such as time to reach the assembly location, the distance travelled, congestion 
experienced by the agents and the safety margins associated with using each evacuation 
route.  A key finding of this work is the importance of formulating evacuation 
procedures that identifies the threatened population, provides timely evacuation notice, 
identifies appropriate routes that maintains a safe distance from the hazard front thereby 
maximising safety margins even at the cost of taking longer evacuation routes. 
Evacuation simulation offers a means of achieving these goals. 
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1 Introduction  
Forest fires (also referred to as wildfires and bushfires) are an annual occurrence in 
many parts of the world causing massive damage to the natural and built environments, 
endangering lives and forcing the large-scale evacuation of entire residential areas and 
business and industrial facilities. Recent examples include the Fort McMurray fires 
(The Globe and Mail, 2016) in Canada (May 2016) which extended over an area of 
590,000 hectares of Alberta involving over 4,000 fire fighters and other emergency 
personnel and resulted in the loss of 2,000 structures, the forced evacuation of 88,000 
people and damage estimated at $CAN3.6 billion (Regional Municipality of Wood 
Buffalo, 2016); the San Bernardino County Blue Cut fires in California (August 2016) 
involving more than 2,600 fire fighters, resulting in the loss of over 100 family 
residences (Incident Information System, 2016) and requiring mandatory evacuation 
calls to over 34,000 homes with more than 82,000 people, ranging from a ski resort to 
the entire town of Phelan with more than 14,000 residents (Chicago Tribune, 2016); 
and the Hafia Israel fires (BBC News, 2016), resulting in the evacuation of some 80,000 
people from homes, schools, kindergartens, universities, a hospital for the aged and 
prisons (BBC News, 2016 and The New York Times, 2016), police and emergency 
services went door to door to alert people on the need to evacuate and the affected 
population evacuated on foot and by car (The New York Times, 2016).   
 
One of the world’s worst wildfires in living memory are the Black Saturday bushfires 
of Victoria Australia (February 2009) which claimed the lives of 173 people, burnt 
430,000 hectares of land, 2000 properties and 61 businesses, with an estimated cost of 
$AUS4 billion (Teague et al. 2009).  Rather than a single fire there were over 47 fires 
scattered across the State that had the potential to become severe, five of which claimed 
people’s lives – the most costly was the Kilmore East fire that claimed 119 lives.  The 
Country Fire Authority (CFA) engaged approximately 12,000 CFA fire fighters and 
over 1000 operational vehicles to fight the fires with the support of an additional 1000 
fire fighters from the Department of Sustainability and the Environment (DSE).  One 
of the issues to come out of the Royal Commission held to investigate the response to 
the fires concerned the advice given to the community on whether or not they should 
evacuate, the so-called ‘stay or go’ policy, more correctly stated as, ‘Prepare, Stay and 
Defend or Leave Early’.  The Commission concluded that the authorities had placed 
insufficient emphasis on the risks of staying and defending ones property and that the 
safest option is always to leave early.  The Commission recommended that, ‘… the 
State introduce a comprehensive approach to evacuation so that this option is planned, 
considered and implemented when it is likely to offer a higher level of protection than 
other contingency options ……’ (Recommendation 5) (Teague et al., 2010). 
 
The threat posed by wildfires is not restricted to countries with hot climates.  A large 
number of wildfires occur in Great Britain every year. In the past four years there have 
been on average 45,000 wildfires each year attended by the fire and rescue services in 
Great Britain (Crowhurst, 2015). Furthermore, warmer and drier conditions, and more 
frequent and longer-lasting heatwaves also raise the risk of wildfires. This risk is 
compounded by the UK’s high population density, which means that fires are more 
likely to encroach into urban environments, posing a significant threat to life. Forest 
fires can spread rapidly affecting built-up areas in its path at different times depending 
on the speed and direction of the fire spread, which in turn is dependent on a number 
of factors such as the wind speed and direction, nature of terrain and available fuel in 
the path of the fire (BBC News, 2016, Chicago Tribune 2016, Regional Municipality 
of Wood Buffalo, 2016, Teague et al., 2009, Teague et al., 2010 and The New York 
Times, 2016). 
 
It is clear that wildfire often requires the evacuation of large numbers of people from 
large areas and potentially over great distances.  The frequent and growing occurrence 
of these events suggests that it is necessary to develop appropriate evacuation plans for 
areas that are susceptible to wildfires.   
 
This paper provides an overview of the development of the EXODUS urban-scale 
evacuation modelling system (Chooramun et al., 2012, Galea et al., 2008, Galea et al., 
2011, Pretorius et al., 2013 and Siddiqui and Gwynne, 2012), and describes the 
application of the software to a case study involving the Swinley Forest fire that 
occurred near Bracknell in Berkshire, UK on May 02, 2011. As part of this work, the 
paper also describes the loose coupling of the EXODUS software to the Prometheus 
wildfire simulation tool (Tymstra et al., 2010). It is suggested that the developed 
methodology could be utilised by authorities to formulate evacuation procedures before 
an incident takes place based on historic data (e.g. past wildfires, floods, earthquakes, 
etc.) and also has scope to be applied during incidents by providing first responders 
with key evacuation related information.  
2 Literature Review 
When planning an evacuation for a community threatened by wildfire, it is essential for 
civil protection authorities to know what areas will be affected due to a fire, when the 
areas will become untenable, how long it will take occupants in these regions to 
evacuate and how long it will take occupants to reach a designated place of safety. To 
this end, fire simulation tools such as Prometheus (Tymstra et al., 2010) and Phoenix  
(Tolhurst et al., 2008) have been developed that attempt to predict  the spread of the 
wildfire.  These models take into consideration the nature of the available fuel, the 
terrain and the atmospheric conditions and provide an estimation of the direction and 
rate of spread of the fire front.   
 
While this type of information is necessary to assess the level of risk associated with 
each region it is not sufficient to optimally determine how and when to warn the 
population appropriately, how to allocate available resources (first responders, fire 
fighters and staff at assembly locations) and most importantly to formulate an effective 
evacuation strategy which involves safe routes that occupants can take to the designated 
assembly locations.  To do this also requires an ability to predict the evacuation 
movement and behaviour of city sized populations of people measuring in the tens of 
thousands if not hundreds of thousands.   
 
Several evacuation models have been developed that attempt to simulate large scale 
evacuation situations resulting from floods (Durst et al., 2014) and earthquakes 
(D’Orazio et al., 2014). MATSIM, a transport simulation tool has been used to perform 
pedestrian evacuation simulation at city scale involving over a million agents (Lämmel, 
2008). The road network is imported from OpenStreetMaps (Neis et al., 2011) and 
represented in MATSIM as a directed graph with the streets being represented as links 
or arcs connecting the vertices or nodes, which represent a point on the earth’s surface. 
Network change events such as altering the state of a link from traversable to non-
traversable occurs dynamically as the simulation runs. Initially all agents utilise a 
shortest path to the refuge areas. However, the Nash equilibrium (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1994) approach is employed where agents attempt to find a route that is 
optimal in terms of the time required to reach the destination in each successive iteration 
taking into account congestion levels encountered on the evacuation routes. Over many 
iterations this approach provides an estimation of the overall shortest evacuation time 
which could represent an evacuation where agents have been trained or guided so as to 
follow a pre-determined procedure. This approach has been used to model the 
pedestrian evacuation simulation of the entire city of Padang, Indonesia involving 
320,000 agents in response to a tsunami (Lämmel et al., 2010) and a part of Zurich 
involving 165,571 agents in response to a flood (Lämmel, 2008). A similar approach 
has been used to model large-scale multi-modal (i.e. involving pedestrians, buses, 
railway and cars) evacuation simulation of Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg, Germany 
consisting of 50,601 inhabitants in response to a flood (Klüpfel, 2014). Travel mode 
change options were also implemented allowing for example agents to walk to a bus 
stop, take a bus to the train station and take a train to a safe location.  
 
The PedGo simulation tool has been used by (Klüpfel, 2014) to perform pre-event and 
post-event pedestrian simulations of a popular event that attracted a very large number 
of visitors (250,000) in Burgdorf, Switzerland. The actual pedestrian traffic flow and 
congestion observed during the event was significantly different (less congestion was 
observed than predicted) from the pre-event simulations mainly because of an 
underestimation of response times and overestimation of the number of people. When 
these factors were modified accordingly the post-event simulations provided a good 
agreement with the observations during the actual event. This illustrates the intricacies 
in large scale evacuations - small deviations from assumptions of initial conditions can 
lead to large differences in the simulation results when compared to the actual event.  
 
The simulation of large-scale evacuation requires the inclusion of a number of human 
behaviour aspects into the modelling process. According to (Osaragi et al., 2013) the 
following factors are key to model large scale evacuations following an earthquake: 
spatiotemporal distribution of people at the time of the earthquake, time at which people 
start evacuating, decision to head to a temporary refuge location or to the official refuge 
location and routes that people choose to use (familiar versus safe routes avoiding 
affected areas). A study of human behaviour during earthquakes, both within structures 
and outside, (Bernardini et al., 2014)  has identified the following behaviours;  
attraction to safe areas, herding behaviour, attraction between members of the same 
group, keeping a safe distance from buildings and group formation. They also 
determined the average speeds and distances between members of the same evacuating 
group and represented these behaviours in a simulation tool by modifying the social 
force model (Helbing and Johansson, 2013).  
 
A city scale evacuation model utilising a potential map system for navigation has been 
developed (Nishino et al., 2011) where agents travel towards refuge locations  taking 
paths that they perceive to be safe while staying away from hazards such as fire. A flood 
simulation model was coupled to an evacuation simulation model (Mordvintsev et al., 
2014) where agents could assume one of several states such as idle, running, safe and 
drowned. Agents followed a potential map avoiding static obstacles as well as non-
traversable flooded areas to reach safe refuge areas.  
 
While several wildfire evacuation models have been developed (Cova and Johnson, 
2002 and Singh et al., 2016), most of these are vehicular models (Cova and Johnson, 
2002 and Singh et al., 2016) thus ignoring pedestrian movement.  Furthermore, few if 
any of the wildfire evacuation models are coupled with fire simulation tools and when 
this is done it is generally for visualisation purposes only as in the Singh et al model 
(Singh et al., 2016) which utilises output from the Phoenix fire simulation tool (Tolhurst 
et al. 2008). Coupling agent based urban scale evacuation models to wildfire simulation 
tools enables the identification of, the available time for safe evacuation, which routes 
become untenable and at what time, population exposure doses to harmful fire products 
during evacuation and safety margins associated with alternative evacuation strategies.  
 
Thus while evacuation models have been developed that attempt to simulate large scale 
evacuation situations most of these are vehicular evacuation models or adapt vehicle 
simulation tools to model pedestrian evacuation utilising only the vehicular network 
thus ignoring areas/routes that could be utilised by pedestrians and utilise a macroscopic 
model for representing space and agent movement.   Furthermore, current urban scale 
agent based evacuation modelling tools are generally not integrated with disaster 
management systems. As a result, disaster managers do not have an easy means to test 
evacuation procedures during pre-incident planning or receive real time support on 
optimal evacuation procedures to adopt during an ongoing incident. Integrating 
evacuation simulation tools with disaster management systems to produce a Common 
Operating Picture (COP) provides valuable evacuation decision support functionality 
for disaster managers to assist in the co-ordination and management of disasters.  
 
Large scale disasters bring together diverse organizations which produce large 
quantities of heterogeneous data. This makes it vital to utilise Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) to co-ordinate disaster management thereby 
making it more effective. Disaster management systems have various components such 
as organisation registry, missing persons registry, shelter registry (camps, hospitals, 
schools), request management system, inventory management system, etc (Careem et 
al., 2007 and Van de Walle and Turoff, 2008). Current disaster management systems 
such as Sahana (Careem et al., 2006 and Currion et al., 2007) typically utilise a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) to capture, store, analyse and manage 
geographically referenced data to provide a coherent system for incident commanders. 
They also rely greatly on open standards to enable communication between diverse 
systems. However, most currently available disaster management systems do not 
presently integrate external simulation tools. In order for external simulation tools to be 
integrated with disaster management systems the simulation tools need to be able to 
read and produce outputs using open standards. 
While the CEMPS (Configurable Emergency Management and Planning Simulator) 
simulator (Silva and Eglese, 2000) comes close to addressing this problem by coupling 
a traffic simulation model with ESRI’s GIS-ARC/INFO, nothing currently exists that 
couples agent based evacuation models with incident management systems.   
 
The approach adopted in this paper differs from previous work by providing a loose 
coupling between the evacuation simulation tool and disaster management system with 
the focus being on pedestrian rather than vehicle traffic simulation in response to large 
scale disasters. The agent based evacuation simulation tool buildingEXODUS while 
primarily used for building evacuation applications (Chooramun et al., 2012, Galea et 
al., 2008 and Galea et al., 2011) has also been used to simulate large crowds in external 
environments (Pretorius et al., 2013 and Siddiqui and Gwynne, 2012).  As part of the 
EU FP7 project IDIRA (Fire Safety Engineering Group, 2015b), the buildingEXODUS 
software was adapted to model large scale external spaces involving not simply the road 
network as current large scale evacuation models do (Lämmel et al., 2008, Lämmel et 
al., 2010) but also involving other objects utilised by pedestrians such as buildings, 
open spaces, paths, etc. It also utilised open GIS standards such as shapefiles (Xia and 
Wei, 2008), Web Map Service (Li et al., 2010) and Web Feature Service (Peng and 
Zhang, 2004) and Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) such as such as PostGIS 
spatial extensions  (Obe and Hsu, 2011) for PostgreSQL database (Drake and Worsley, 
2002), OpenLayers  (Perez, 2012) a JavaScript library for displaying map data in web 
browsers to develop a user friendly GUI that the strategic (command and control 
centres) and tactical (on-scene) commanders could utilise to specify input data for the 
EXODUS simulation such as: areas to evacuate, refuge locations, non-traversable areas 
and distribution and attributes of pedestrian population. The GUI also enables 
commanders to run simulations and analyse the results in order to determine the 
efficiency of the various evacuation options available. In this way the EXODUS 
software was integrated within the web based GIS disaster management system (COP) 
developed as part of the IDIRA project. The developed system was found to be a 
valuable decision support tool for the people/organisations involved in disaster 
management.   
 
3 The EXODUS Large Scale Evacuation System 
The EXODUS large scale evacuation modelling system is an agent based 
evacuation model capable of simulating the evacuation of large populations – measured 
in the hundreds of thousands - in large scale environments – measuring many square 
kilometres.  It is based on the buildingEXODUS (Chooramun et al., 2012, Galea et al., 
2008, Galea et al., 2011, Pretorius et al., 2013 and Siddiqui and Gwynne, 2012) 
software and consists of three components; urbanEXODUS, webEXODUS and the 
EXODUS engine as shown in Figure 1.  Each of these are briefly described in the 
following section.  
 
Figure 1: Diagram showing the usage of urban and webEXODUS 
3.1 urbanEXODUS 
A desktop interface, urbanEXODUS, was developed to enable the EXODUS engine to 
easily represent large scale urban spaces. It is capable of receiving geospatial vector 
data from an OSM XML (Neis et al., 2012) file and converting it into a virtual 
representation of space that is suitable for modelling pedestrian evacuation. It is also 
capable of producing simulation output in the form of shapefiles that can be published 
to GIS servers thus aiding visualisation of simulation output on web based GIS 
interfaces. The main use of urbanEXODUS is pre-incident during the planning and 
preparation phase of a possible large scale evacuation by simulating various what-if 
evacuation scenarios. 
 
While MATSIM only models the street network from an OSM XML file, 
urbanEXODUS models additional real world spatial objects that pedestrians may make 
use of during an evacuation including buildings, open spaces (public spaces, car parks, 
piers, parks, etc). Once the virtual environment is modelled within urbanEXODUS the 
user can then specify the population, hazards and procedural data, to define an 
evacuation scenario. In addition to generating an xml output file providing details of 
the evacuation simulation results, urbanEXODUS also generates the population density 
contours in a geospatial data format such as shapefiles (Xia and Wei, 2008) so these 
can be overlayed on baselayers such as Google Maps, OpenStreetMaps or Bing Maps 
on a browser.  
 
3.2 webEXODUS 
A portable GIS based web interface, webEXODUS, was developed to be utilised during 
an incident. It is connected to the evacuation simulation server over the Internet and can 
be accessed remotely via browsers on desktop PCs, tablets or smartphones. It can also 
be used during the planning and preparation phase similar to urbanEXODUS. However, 
it is primarily intended for use during an incident by strategic command in the command 
and control centre providing a generic data model to describe a variety of evacuation 
simulations and run these simulations on the remote evacuation server. By enabling the 
current tactical situation to be represented in the evacuation simulation and providing a 
set of tools to rapidly analyse the results the system assists strategic commanders decide 
which evacuation procedure to employ based on the situation as it unfolds.  
 
webEXODUS requires the EXODUS geometry to have been prepared prior to the 
incident enabling end users to simply specify the evacuation scenario(s) they wish to 
consider during the actual incident. The evacuation scenarios can include expected (e.g. 
generated from census data) or observed (e.g. generated by local authorities) population 
levels and distributions, hazard locations (e.g. generated from model predictions or 
observational data from operatives in the field) and evacuation procedures. 
webEXODUS is connected to the EXODUS engine over the Internet and can initiate 
new simulations remotely. After completion of the simulation, it is possible to view the 
evacuation progress as population density contours on a standard browser. 
webEXODUS has been integrated with the IDIRA disaster management system. 
During an incident, it allows users in the command and control centre to publish the 
results of an evacuation scenario that is most representative of the ensuing event to the 
IDIRA COP, a component of the IDIRA system, that provides the incident commanders 
in the field a summary of the myriad components involved in the rescue and relief 
efforts following a large scale disaster. This information assists the commanders in the 
field to make informed decisions in coordinating the evacuation of people during 
disasters.    
3.3 EXODUS Engine 
The EXODUS engine (Chooramun et al., 2012, Galea et al., 2008, Galea et al., 2011, 
Pretorius et al., 2013 and Siddiqui and Gwynne, 2012)   receives simulation inputs from 
urbanEXODUS or webEXODUS, performs the simulations and returns the results. 
Within the EXODUS engine agents are represented as individuals with each agent 
being defined by a set of attributes. The attributes broadly fall into four categories: 
physical (such as age, gender, agility, mobility), psychological (such as patience, drive, 
response time), experiential (such as distance travelled, time travelled, time waiting in 
congestion) and physiological (such as respiration rate, impact of narcotic and irritant 
gases, impact of heat). These attributes have the dual purpose of defining all occupants 
as individuals while allowing their progress and condition during the evacuation to be 
tracked.  Agents can also be provided with itineraries which can modify their behaviour 
prior to and during the evacuation process.  For example, an agent may decide to collect 
their children from school prior to starting to evacuate, or may need to undertake a 
number of tasks in their dwelling prior to starting to evacuate.    
 The EXODUS engine is a hybrid model capable of utilising coarse node, fine node and 
continuous spatial representations (Chooramun et al., 2012). The coarse and fine node 
modes of the EXODUS engine have been utilised with the former providing quick 
preliminary results at a faster than real time rate and the latter providing more refined 
results but requiring longer run times. The coarse node model employs ‘location 
estimation’ techniques by estimating the location and spread of agents within the 
region. This is to partially compensate for inherent uncertainties associated with pure 
coarse node modelling thus improving the accuracy of the movement model and hence 
the overall predictions.  It also allows for the calculation of population densities within 
sub-regions of the coarse nodes. The same technique is also utilised to record the 
number of people in 6m X 6m grid cells which are used to produce a heat map showing 
population density contours. The coarse node model also employs varying walk speeds 
depending on whether the agent is traversing paved paths or off road paths. Junctions 
such as road junctions are modelled as special coarse nodes which can represent multi-
directional flow. 
 
 
3.4 System Overview 
An overview of the utilisation of the three components - urbanEXODUS, webEXODUS 
and EXODUS engine during the preparation/planning and emergency responses phases 
of disaster management is provided in Figure 2. Sometime before an incident, the 
spatial data and hazard simulation data are provided as inputs to urbanEXODUS. The 
spatial data is currently in the form of an OSM XML file. The OSM data includes the 
coordinates of the geospatial objects as well as their description. For example the OSM 
data includes the co-ordinates of an object and includes a description identifying the 
type of object such as a building, road or park. urbanEXODUS reads the OSM data and 
builds a virtual representation of space to model pedestrian movement in it. The KML 
fire perimeter output from the fire spread model, Prometheus (Tymstra et al., 2010) was 
also provided as an input to urbanEXODUS.  This helped identify the times at which 
critical areas in the modelled area became untenable due to fire.  
During the planning and preparation phase, end users can then configure an evacuation 
scenario by specifying population and procedural data. Population data mainly includes 
the number of people in the region, their attributes and manner of their distribution. 
Procedural data includes the manner in which the population is to be alerted, population 
response times, identification of personal itineraries for the population and routes taken. 
The EXODUS engine receives the scenario input from urbanEXODUS and runs the 
simulation. During simulation, the EXODUS engine stores the population density 
contours as the simulation progresses at pre-defined time-steps in the form of 
Shapefiles. Upon completion of the simulation, the simulation results are transferred to 
urbanEXODUS. The key results include the overall evacuation times, individual 
evacuation times of each agent in the simulation along with other results such as 
congestion times and safety margins. The Shapefiles are stored on a GIS server thus 
allowing the simulation progress to be overlaid on basemaps using webEXODUS.  
During the emergency response phase, webEXODUS could be utilised by strategic 
level incident commanders to view the results of the simulations performed during the 
planning and preparation phase thus assisting them to decide what evacuation procedure 
to employ. However, not all eventualities can be tested prior to an incident and hence 
incident commanders can also modify scenarios using the latest tactical information 
reflecting the current situation and rerun the simulation. The web interface of 
webEXODUS has been simplified so it can be utilised by those who are unfamiliar with 
evacuation simulation tools. After analysing different evacuation procedures, the 
incident commanders can publish the most suitable evacuation procedure to a disaster 
management system or COP (Prinz, 2014) which provides a Common Operational 
Picture in real-time, sharing disaster related information from all parties on strategic, 
tactical and operational levels.  The evacuation simulation results published on the COP 
assists the tactical and operational commanders to manage the tactical implementation 
of the evacuation process by implementing a set of evacuation actions.  
 
Figure 2: System overview depicting the use of urbanEXODUS during 
planning/preparation and webEXODUS during emergency response phases of a 
large scale incident. 
4 urbanEXODUS Application Example – Swinley Forest Fire 
4.1 Initial conditions 
The Swinley forest fire was contained within a 110 hectare region of the Swinley forest 
(located in southeast England), directly threatening built-up areas.  In this example the 
population within the built-up area is hypothetical and used purely for demonstration 
purposes.  The threatened area consisted of, the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL), 
consisting of approximately 800 people of mixed working age, a large business estate 
(BE), consisting of approximately 200 people of mixed working age and predominantly 
young, a pub, consisting of approximately 200 people of mixed age with a number of 
elderly and 10% having some form of minor moving disability, and five residential 
dwellings (RD), each consisting of a family of two adults and two children.  The fire 
also threatened near-by towns of Bracknell and Crowthorne, the Broadmoor High 
Security Hospital and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The fire, the largest in 
Berkshire’s history, was attended at one point by 55 appliances from 12 brigades. 
Fortunately, a road running along the built-up area (B3348) acted as a fire break 
preventing the fire from spreading to the built-up area. Following this fire considerable 
analysis was undertaken to determine the impact on the built areas had the wind 
changed (Gazzard, 2014).  One scenario considered a wind change of 900 to the North 
West.  This was modelled using the Prometheus fire spread modelling tool (Smith, 
2014). If these conditions had occurred during the fire it would have prompted the 
evacuation of the nearby built-up area (see Figure 3).  
 
An overview of the area modelled in EXODUS is shown in Figure 3 (total area, 1.58 
km2). The fire simulations are based on real meteorological data (e.g. fuel maps and 
ignition locations/times) as recorded on 2 May 2011, however, with slightly different 
wind conditions (speed and direction).  The output shows the simulated spread of the 
fire for over seven hours using 30-minute intervals. The residents of the indicated 
buildings are evacuated to the assembly area at the Great Hollands recreation ground, 
located on the north east side of the built-up area. All the routes leading to the assembly 
area used by the agents in the simulations are shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: The simulated area in Bracknell which was affected by the wildfire of 
May 02, 2011 with the simulated hypothetical fire front at 7 hrs after fire 
initiation (in 30-minute intervals). 
4.2 EVACUATION SCENARIOS 
 
The evacuation process is undertaken on foot as it is assumed that the roads need 
to be kept free for use by emergency vehicles and road conditions are considered 
hazardous for vehicles due to reduced visibility resulting from smoke.  A total of 1220 
agents were distributed in the directly threatened locations (pub, TRL, BE and RD).  
 
During a wildfire affecting large areas it is essential for incident commanders to know 
which areas to evacuate first (Cova et al., 2005 and Pultar et al., 2009).  To do this they 
need to know when the fire is likely to directly threaten the occupied area, when the 
fire is likely to threaten proposed evacuation routes, how long is it likely to take to clear 
the threatened areas and how long it will take for the evacuating population to pass 
through the at risk evacuation routes.   Key locations on the evacuation routes, labelled 
A to G, are depicted in Figure 3. These represent ‘critical locations’ which the 
evacuating population must pass to be considered safe from the approaching fire.  These 
locations were determined by analysing both the fire progression within the fire 
simulation and the movement of the population within the evacuation simulation.   
However, rather than the fire front we make use of the hazard front.  The hazard front 
is the region ahead of the fire front that is considered to be untenable.  At this point the 
smoke concentration, visibility and temperature are considered untenable.  Ideally, the 
forest fire model should provide information relating not only to the location of the fire 
front, but also the position, optical density and composition of the smoke front hence 
enabling the identification of the hazard front.  
 
Unfortunately, current forest fire models, including Prometheus, do not have this 
capability and so a 250 m region ahead of the fire front is assumed to mark the 
hazardous extent of the fire smoke, here called the hazard front.  Thus by knowing the 
location of the fire front at any point in time (as determined by the fire model), the 
location of the hazard front, ahead of the fire front, can be determined.  Where the 
hazard front crosses an evacuation route a critical region is identified (see Figure 4).  
For the evacuation route to be considered safe, the last of the agents using that route 
must have passed through the critical region and hence be beyond a critical location 
defining the boundary of the critical region before the hazard front reaches the critical 
location.  The safety margin associated with the compromised route is the difference in 
time between the time for the predicted hazard front to reach the critical location and 
the predicted time for the last person to pass through the critical location.  
 
This concept is demonstrated in Figure 4.  Here the hazard front crosses the evacuation 
route at time 𝑡6.  The location of the hazard front at this time is identified by  
𝐿𝑡6
1  and 𝐿𝑡6
2  (critical locations) with the critical region being defined as the region on 
the evacuation route between these critical locations (in this example, 𝐿𝑡6
1  <
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 <  𝐿𝑡6
2 ).  The last person in the population moving along the 
evacuation route has location at time 𝑡𝑖 defined by 𝐿𝑡𝑖
𝑃 .  Thus for the population to be 
considered safe, the last person must be beyond the critical region defined by the trailing 
critical location in the direction of travel and so in this example 𝐿𝑡6
𝑃  >  𝐿𝑡6
2 .  The safety 
margin is then defined as the difference between the time at which the hazard front is 
at the critical location, in this example given by 𝐿𝑡6
2  (𝑡6), and the time at which the last 
person was at the critical location, in this example given by (𝑡4), i.e.  
𝑡6 − 𝑡4, where 𝑡6 is determined from the fire simulation and 𝑡4 is determined from the 
evacuation simulation. 
 
As the fire progresses, the hazard front may follow the evacuating population creating 
a sequence of critical locations and associated safety margins for a given portion of 
evacuation route.  The safety margin for the population on the affected route is then 
taken as the minimum of the sequence of safety margins and the associated critical 
location is identified.  Ideally, this sequence would be determined automatically by the 
coupled fire and evacuation simulation environment which would then determine the 
minimum safety margin and associated key critical location.   However, in the work 
presented here the most critical locations for each route and each population (generating 
the minimum safety margins) are manually estimated by viewing both the fire and 
evacuation simulation.  Thus the reported safety margins can only be considered 
approximate.    
 
Figure 4: Defining critical region on an evacuation route 
 
Four scenarios are investigated; they consist of a base case in which it is assumed that 
all evacuation routes are available and three other cases in which various evacuation 
routes are considered non-tenable. Each case assumes the same population composition 
and distribution and the same fire conditions.  An overview of the four scenarios is 
provided in Table 1.  Within each figure in the table, the arrows indicate the direction 
of travel of the agents from the buildings. The dashed lines with a cross denote loss of 
routes. 
Table 1: Overview of evacuation scenarios. 
Scenario Diagram Description 
1 
 
Base case scenario assuming that all routes are 
available. Hence all agents take the shortest route 
to the assembly location. The critical locations A 
(TRL), B (Pub), C, G (RD) and E (BE) represent 
the locations that each identified group of agents 
must reach prior to the arrival of the hazard front. 
2 
 
 
 
Assumes the path out of TRL connecting to the 
Nine Mile Road (B3430) is closed/unusable due 
to use by emergency vehicles. The agents in TRL 
are thus forced to take a longer route through the 
BE. The critical location for the agents in TRL is 
now F instead of A. 
3 
 
Assumes that a part of the Bracknell road is 
unsafe to use forcing the agents in the residential 
dwellings to take a slightly longer route via Old 
Wokingham Road - Nine Mile Road to the 
shelter location. In this case, the critical location 
for the agents in the RD is D instead of C. This 
part of the Bracknell road is the first route to be 
affected by the fire and hence this is an important 
scenario. 
4 
 
This scenario assumes that the route losses from 
Scenarios 2 and 3 are merged in this scenario. 
 
All the scenarios have the same initial conditions in terms of the number, nature, and 
distribution of agents, their response times and the location of the assembly area which 
is at the Great Hollands Recreation centre located in the north east. The four scenarios 
differ in terms of the routes taken by the evacuating population. The routes utilised by 
the agents in the four scenarios and the critical locations for the various establishments 
are shown in Table 1. The critical locations A to G differ for each scenario depending 
upon the routes taken by the agents. For example, in Scenario 1, the agents located 
within the TRL building are considered to be safe after clearing critical location A. 
However, in Scenario 2 a different path is adopted by the TRL agents and so the critical 
location for these agents is now location F.  
 
Within each scenario the agent response times were specified as follows: 
 Pub: 30 - 60 s, proprietor alerted by phone call from police at t = 0 s. 
 TRL: 60 - 120 s, building managers alerted by phone call from police at t = 0 
s.  
 BE:  60 - 120 s, building managers alerted by phone call from police at t = 0 s. 
 RD: 10 to 16 min, alerted by the police door knock. Each dwelling is visited in 
turn by a police patrol that informs residents to evacuate. The police reach the 
first house at t = 300 s. The second house is visited 60 s later and so on. Each 
household is arbitrarily assigned a 5 min response time once alerted.  It is 
assumed that the residential dwellings have been pre-warned of the possible 
need to evacuate and so have prepared for the evacuation.  
 
Occupant response times for these types of situations are not known and so the values 
used in these simulations are intended for demonstration purposes. In reality it is likely 
that people would have much longer response times, especially for RD. Furthermore, it 
is possible that some of the occupants of the RD may chose not to evacuate but to defend 
their properties.  In addition, the start of the evacuation (t = 0 s) occurs at the time of 
fire initiation.  This is unlikely to be the case in reality as it will take some time for the 
fire to grow to a size that can be detected and then for the fire to develop to the point 
that it may be considered a threat.  However for simplicity in this demonstration the 
evacuation process is considered to start at the start of the fire. The walking speeds of 
the agents in the simulations is randomly allocated between 0.85 m/s to 1.1 m/s.  Note 
that these speeds are less than the normal defaults used in buildingEXODUS which are 
usually between 1.2 m/s and 1.5 m/s.  In reality the walking speed of people would 
depend on a range of factors such as age, gender, disability, nature of group, fatigue, 
etc. These simplifications should be taken into consideration when assessing the results 
presented.  
 
5 Results and Discussion 
The evacuation simulation results for the four scenarios are presented in this section. 
Each scenario was run ten times and the values referred to in this section represent the 
average of these ten simulations. The arrival times and safety margin graphs for each 
scenario are presented and discussed in this section. The arrival times graph shows the 
times at which agents arrive at the assembly location. The safety margins graph shows 
the time for the fire front to be within 250 m of a critical location, the time for the last 
person to pass through the critical region and the safety margin, which is the difference 
between these two times.  It is noted that all the simulations are performed using an 
Intel Xeon E5-1620 computer with a clock speed of 3.6 GHz and 64 GB of RAM. 
5.1 Scenario 1 
5.1.1 Arrival times 
The arrival times of the entire population at the assembly location is shown in Figure 
5. The agents in the pub are closest to the assembly location, have a short response time, 
and hence are the first to arrive at 13 min. All 200 agents from the pub reach the 
assembly location within 19 min from the start of the simulation. After the pub, the 
agents from TRL are the nearest and start to arrive in the assembly area at around 22 
min. The 800 agents from TRL assemble within 35 min. The first agents from the BE 
arrive at around the same time as the last agents from TRL and start assembling at 35 
min. The 200 agents from the BE assemble by 52 min after the start of simulation. The 
agents from the RD are the last to arrive as they have much higher response times and 
distance to travel compared to the rest of the population. The 20 agents in the RD and 
hence the entire population assembles in 1 hr 12 min 45 s (72.75 min). The EXODUS 
engine provided the simulation results in 3 min 22 s. It was thus possible to run the 
simulation 21.4 times faster than real time. 
 Figure 5: Arrival times at the assembly location for Scenario 1 
5.1.2 Safety margins 
The time for the agents to clear the relevant critical locations, the time for non-tenable 
conditions to develop at the critical locations (i.e. the time for the hazard front to reach 
the critical location) and the safety margin (i.e. the difference between the time for non-
tenable conditions to develop at the critical location and time for the agents to clear the 
critical locations) for Scenario 1 is shown in Figure 6. The agents in the pub are quick 
to clear critical location B, doing so in 4 min 28 s. The fire approaches critical location 
B at 1 hr 31 min. The agents in the pub therefore have a safety margin of 1 hr 26 min 
30s. The safety margin is intended to compensate for a number of uncertainties within 
the evacuation modelling including for example, delays in notifying the population, 
delays in population response, slower walking speeds, etc.  For example, the pub 
residents could be warned of the need to start their evacuation up to 1 hr 26 min 30s 
later than assumed within the simulation and they would still be able to reach safety.   
The agents from TRL and the BE have the largest safety margins (more than 4 hr) as 
they are quick to clear their relevant critical location and the fire is predicted to take a 
longer time to affect their routes.  In this scenario, the agents in the RD have the smallest 
safety margin of just 12 min which is primarily due to them requiring a relatively long 
time (48 min) to clear the relevant critical location G.  The hazard front is also quick to 
approach this critical location at 1 hr. At the other critical location C, located further 
along the evacuation route, the agents from the RD have a safety margin of 37 min 6 s 
which is mainly due to the hazard front taking a longer time to reach this location at 1hr 
and 31 min. Clearly the agents from the RD have to clear both critical locations (C and 
G), but the critical location with the smallest safety margin is critical location G and so 
this defines the critical safety margin. Though the hazard front also approaches critical 
location B in approximately the same period of time, the agents in the pub clear this 
critical location very quickly (less than 5 min) and hence this is not considered a great 
threat for the pub occupants. If the people in the RD are to take the Bracknell road to 
reach the assembly location it is essential that they are warned as quickly as possible.  
Thus the police doing the door knock must not lose time in road congestion getting to 
the RD, once they arrive they must spend very little time explaining the situation and 
the residents must then respond to the warning quickly as they only have a safely margin 
of 12 min.  Given how tight the safety margins are for the RD in this scenario, the 
evacuation strategy adopted in this scenario is not considered viable. 
 
Figure 6: Evacuation and fire timelines for the different establishments in 
Scenario 1 
5.2 Scenario 2 
5.2.1 Arrival times 
Similar to Scenario 1, the agents in the pub assemble within 19 min (see Figure 7) as 
there is no change to their evacuation route. In Scenario 2 agents from TRL are forced 
to take a longer path via the BE as shown in Table 1. Thus in this scenario the agents 
in TRL have a longer route to the assembly location compared to the agents from BE. 
The agents from the BE are thus the next to start arriving at the assembly location at 34 
min. Due to a distribution of walk speeds between 0.85m/s and 1.1 m/s the fastest agents 
from TRL assemble before the slowest agents from BE. The agents from BE and TRL 
assemble within 1 hr 7 min.  The last agents to arrive are again the agents from the RD.  
The first agents from the RD begin to arrive at around the same time as the last agents 
from TRL.  The last of the agents from the RD and hence the overall assembly time for 
this scenario is 1 hr 11 min which is very similar to Scenario 1. The total evacuation 
times have not changed significantly in these two scenarios as the agents from the RD 
are always the last to arrive and their route has not changed. However, 800 agents from 
TRL take a longer route (3 km) to the assembly location in Scenario 2 which is twice 
the distance of the route taken in Scenario 1 (1.5 km). Furthermore, the average level 
of congestion experienced by the agents from TRL (measured by the average 
Cumulative Wait Time or CWT) is 84% greater than the level of congestion they 
experienced in Scenario 2. The average time a TRL agent spent in reaching the 
assembly location (measured by the Personal Elapsed Time or PET) has increased by 
93% in Scenario 2. This indicates that even though the overall evacuation times are 
similar in Scenarios 1 and 2 the two scenarios differ significantly in terms of the 
evacuation dynamics experienced by the various sub-populations. The EXODUS 
engine provided the simulation results in 3 min 38 s. It was thus possible to run the 
simulation 19.5 times faster than real time. 
 Figure 7: Arrival times at the assembly location for Scenario 2 
5.2.2 Safety margins 
The safety margins for the agents in the various buildings in Scenario 2 are shown in 
Figure 8. The agents in the pub and the RD have similar safety margins as in Scenario 
1. The agents in TRL now have two critical locations to clear – critical locations F and 
E. Clearing the first critical location F indicates that they have cleared the TRL site and 
hence are safe in the event of the fire approaching the TRL site. Critical location F is 
closer to the approaching hazard front than critical location A, thus the time for the fire 
hazards to approach critical location F is shorter than the time for the fire hazards to 
approach critical location A. This is the main reason for the 29 min decrease in the 
safety margin available for the agents from TRL in Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1. 
The TRL agents thus have a 4 hour 21 min 18 s safety margin at critical location A. In 
this scenario the TRL agents have to take a similar path to the assembly location as the 
agents from BE. Hence they need to also clear the critical location E along with the BE 
agents. The BE agents are the first to clear the location E at 13 min 18 s giving them a 
safety margin of 6 hr 18 min 42 s. The first of the TRL agents to arrive at location E do 
so at14 min which is approximately 1 min after the last of the BE agents have left the 
region. Thus there is no interaction between the agents from the BE and TRL at location 
E. The agents from TRL clear location E at 26 min 36 s giving them a safety margin of 
6 hr 5 min 24 s. Since the TRL agents have to clear two critical locations A and E the 
lower safety margin 4 hr 21 min 18 s is considered as their critical safety margin in this 
scenario. 
 Figure 8: Evacuation and fire timelines for the different establishments in 
Scenario 2 
5.3 Scenario 3 
5.3.1 Arrival times 
The difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 is the loss of a part of Bracknell 
Road forcing the agents in the RD to take a slightly longer route. There are 20 agents 
from the RD who are the last to reach the assembly location. Therefore, the arrival times 
graph for Scenario 3 (see Figure 9) is similar to that of Scenario 1 (see Figure 5) except 
for a small difference towards the end of the evacuation which is a result of the RD 
agents taking a slightly longer time to reach the assembly region. The assembly time 
for the agents from the RD and hence the overall assembly time for the entire population 
in this scenario is 1 hr 26 min which is greater than Scenario 1 by 15 min. The overall 
assembly time for this scenario is 1 hr 26 min 14 s. The EXODUS engine provided the 
simulation results in 3 min 55 s. It was thus possible to run the simulation 22 times 
faster than real time. 
 
Figure 9: Arrival times at the assembly location for Scenario 3 
5.3.2 Safety margins 
The safety margins for the agents in the various buildings in Scenario 3 are shown in 
Figure 10. Although Scenario 3 produces the longest overall evacuation time of the 
three scenarios, the agents in the RD have a higher safety margin, 2 hr 45 min compared 
to only 37 min in Scenarios 1 and 2. This is because the critical location for the RD on 
this alternative route, location D, is further away from the approaching fire front than 
critical location C. The agents in the RD are also slightly closer to critical location D 
than critical location C and thus pass critical location D sooner than they would have 
passed critical location C.  The safety margins for TRL, BE and the Pub remain the 
same as those for Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 10: Evacuation and fire timelines for the different establishments in 
Scenario 3 
5.4 Scenario 4 
5.4.1 Arrival times 
The arrival times of the agents from the various buildings at the assembly location are 
shown in Figure 11. The overall shape of the arrival curve is similar to Scenario 2 as in 
both these scenarios the TRL agents take a slightly longer route to the assembly station. 
However, the total assembly time in this scenario is similar to that in Scenario 3 as the 
last agents to assemble in both Scenarios 3 and 4 are the agents from the RD and in 
both scenarios these agents are forced to  take a slightly longer route as part of the 
Bracknell Road is assumed to be unusable. The overall assembly time for Scenario 4 is 
1 hr 24 min 38 s. The EXODUS engine provided the simulation results in 4 min 12 s. 
It was thus possible to run the simulation 20.2 times faster than real time. 
 Figure 11: Arrival times at the assembly location for Scenario 4 
5.4.2 Safety Margins 
The safety margins for the agents in the various buildings in Scenario 4 are shown in 
Figure 12. The safety margin available for the agents in the pub is almost identical 
across all four scenarios as their path has not been altered. The safety margin available 
for the TRL agents is the same as that in Scenario 2 as in these two scenarios the agents 
from TRL take the same route. Similar to Scenario 2 the TRL agents have a second 
critical location, location E to clear along with the agents from the BE. The BE agents 
clear this location first at 13 min 6 s and have a safety margin of 6hr 18 min 54s. There 
is a gap of approximately 1 min between the times for the last BE to clear location E 
and the time for the first TRL agent to reach it. The TRL agents clear location E at 26 
min 42 s giving them a safety margin of 6 hr 5 min 18 s. The lower of the two safety 
margins for the agents from TRL, which is 4 hr 21 min 18 s at location F, is hence more 
critical in this scenario. The safety margin for the agents from the RD is approximately 
the same as that for Scenario 3 as in these two scenarios the agents from the RD utilise 
the same path. 
 
Figure 12: Evacuation and fire timelines for the different establishments in 
Scenario 4 
5.5 Comparison of the four scenarios 
5.5.1 Assembly times and distance travelled 
The assembly times and distance travelled by the agents from the different locations in 
each scenario is shown in Table 2. The agents from the pub are always the first to 
assemble. The RD agents are always the last to assemble in all scenarios and thus 
determine the overall assembly times for the entire population. A graph of the times at 
which the agents arrive at the assembly locations for all the four scenarios is shown in 
Figure 13.  
The evacuation dynamics for Scenarios 1 and 3 are quite similar and the evacuation 
dynamics of Scenarios 2 and 4 are quite similar, but both pairs exhibit quite different 
evacuation dynamics to each other.  The evacuation dynamics in Scenarios 1 and 3 are 
similar as the only difference between the two scenarios is that the agents from the RD 
take a slightly longer route in Scenario 3 (2.7 km versus 3.0 km) compared to Scenario 
1. In these scenarios we note that there is a rapid build-up of people in the assembly 
area after approximately 21 min.  This is due to the arrival of people from TRL.  While 
the evacuation dynamics in these two scenarios are broadly similar, there is a large 
difference (14 min or 20%) in the overall assembly times between these two scenarios.  
This is a result of the agents from the RD travelling an additional 0.3 km to reach the 
assembly location in Scenario 3.   
 
The evacuation dynamics in Scenarios 2 and 4 are quite similar as again, the only 
difference between these two scenarios is that the agents from the RD take a slightly 
longer route in Scenario 4 (2.7 km versus 3.0 km) compared to Scenario 2. In these 
scenarios we note that there is a slower build-up of people in the assembly area 
compared to that in Scenarios 1 and 3.  This difference is due to the occupants from 
TRL taking a longer route to the assembly location (3.0 km versus 1.5 km) in Scenarios 
2 and 4 compared to Scenarios 1 and 2.  This has a significant impact on the 
development of the arrival times.  Indeed, as noted in Figure 3, after the arrival of the 
last occupants from the pub into the assembly area there is a period of about 16 min 
when no further agents arrive in the assembly location.  While Scenarios 2 and 4 have 
broadly similar evacuation dynamics, there is again a large difference (14 min or 20%) 
in overall assembly times between these two scenarios.  As with Scenarios 1 and 3, this 
is due to the slightly longer evacuation route taken by the occupants of the RD in 
Scenario 4 compared to Scenario 2.   
 
The overall assembly times in Scenarios 1 and 2 are similar as are those in Scenarios 3 
and 4.  This is because the final assembly times are determined by the arrival times of 
the RD occupants.  In Scenarios 1 and 2 the occupants of the RD follow the same route 
(most direct route) while in Scenarios 3 and 4 they follow the slightly longer route.  
Hence the overall assembly times for Scenarios 1 and 2 are slightly shorter (71 min or 
16%) compared to those for Scenarios 3 and 4 (85 min).  
 
In all four scenarios the agents in the pub start arriving at the assembly location 13 min 
after the call to evacuate. All 200 agents from the pub assemble after 20 min. The agents 
in the pub take the same routes (0.8 km), have the same response times and do not share 
their escape route with other agents for all the four scenarios. This explains why they 
exhibit a uniform behaviour in all four scenarios. In Scenarios 1 and 3 the agents from 
TRL take the next shortest route (1.5 km) to the assembly location. Hence in these 
scenarios they arrive next and start to arrive at the assembly location after around 22 
min. There is a 3 min gap between the last person arriving from the pub and the first 
person arriving from TRL in Scenarios 1 and 3. The 800 agents from TRL travel 1.5 
km and assemble within 36 min. The first agents from the BE arrive at the assembly 
location about the same time as the last agents from TRL. The 200 agents from the BE 
travel 2.3 km and assemble within 52 min. The agents in the RD are the next to arrive 
and start to assemble after 61 min in Scenario 1 and 64 min in Scenario 3. This is 
because the agents from the RD take a slightly longer route in Scenario 3 compared to 
Scenario 1 – 0.3 km longer. All the agents from the RD are assembled after 1 hr 11 min 
in Scenario 1 and 1 hr 26 min in Scenario 3.  
Table 3: Times to assemble and distance travelled by the agents in various 
establishments in the four scenarios 
Scenarios Assembly times (HH:MM:SS) Distance travelled (km) 
Pub TRL BE RD/ALL Pub TRL BE RD 
1 00:18:38 00:35:26 00:51:36 01:11:32 0.8 1.5 2.3 2.7 
2 00:18:37 01:07:05 00:52:09 01:10:26 0.8 3.0 2.3 2.7 
3 00:18:42 00:35:35 00:51:16 01:26:01 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.0 
4 00:18:40 01:07:25 00:52:31 01:24:25 0.8 3.0 2.3 3.0 
 
 
Figure 13: Comparison of the arrival times at the assembly location. The times at 
which proportions (50%, 80%, 95% and 100%) of the entire population 
assemble is denoted by horizontal dashed lines. 
5.5.2 Assembly Performance  
 
The times at which various proportions (50%, 80%, 95% and 100%) of the population 
arrive at the assembly location is provided in Table 4. As already noted there is a rapid 
build-up of people in the assembly area in Scenarios 1 and 3 compared to Scenarios 2 
and 4.  This is due to the occupants from TRL taking the direct route to the assembly 
station. From Table 3 we note that within Scenarios 1 and 3, not only do 50 % of the 
population arrive at the assembly location in just under 31 min (compared to just over 
55 min in Scenarios 2 and 4), but 95% of the total population have assembled in a 
shorter time than the time taken for 50% of the population to assemble in Scenarios 2 
and 4. Thus in Scenarios 1 and 3 it is essential that the assembly locations are staffed 
and ready to handle the arrival of large numbers of people in a relatively short period 
of time – 30 min from the start of the evacuation process.  
 
Furthermore, in Scenarios 1 and 3 the arrival time curve has a long tail, the last 5% of 
the population requiring between 26 min (in Scenario 1) and 41 min (in Scenario 3).  
This is equivalent to the time required for the first 50% to arrive in the assembly in the 
assembly location.  Indeed, in Scenario 3, the last 5% of the population require almost 
50% of the total assembly time. 
 
Table 4: Times at which proportion of entire population assembled 
Proportion 
Assembled 
50%  
(610) 
80%    
(976) 
95%    
(1159) 
100%    
(1220) 
Scenario 1 00:30:56 00:35:05 00:45:19 01:11:45 
Scenario 2 00:55:22 01:02:30 01:05:58 01:10:54 
Scenario 3 00:30:55 00:35:06 00:45:29 01:26:14 
Scenario 4 00:55:20 01:02:40 01:06:11 01:24:38 
 
5.5.3 Safety Margins 
Presented in Table 5 are the safety margins associated with the various populations in 
each scenario. The smallest safety margins are 11 min and 12 min for the occupants of 
the RD in Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively and 87 min for the occupants of the pub in 
Scenarios 3 and 4. The longest safety margins are over 360 min and are associated with 
the population from the BE in all four scenarios.  
 
The very short safety margins associated with Scenarios 1 and 2 are due to the 
occupants from the RD taking the shortest route to the assembly location i.e. along 
Bracknell Road, which inevitably takes them quite close to the fire start location and 
directly in the path of fire spread.  Given that the start of the evacuation process is 
associated with the start of the fire, this means that there could only be a maximum of 
11 min delay between the start of the fire and the notification of the population in the 
RD before Scenarios 1 and 2 would become non-viable.   
 
In Scenarios 3 and 4, the RD population take the longest route to the assembly location, 
i.e. along Old Wokingham Road, which takes them effectively away from the hazard 
front and hence gives them a much higher safety margin of over 165 min (associated 
with clearing critical point D). Although the RD agents travel a longer route (0.3 km 
more) via the Old Wokingham Road, it is the route that offers them maximum safety 
and is the only viable route given the delay likely between starting the evacuation and 
detecting the fire. The Pub occupants also have a relatively small safety margin 
requiring them to start their evacuation within 86 min of fire initiation, regardless of 
which scenario is considered. The agents in the other establishments (TRL and BE) 
have more than four hour safety margin in all scenarios and hence can be considered to 
be quite safe in terms of warning time and time needed to reach safety locations. 
 
Table 5: Critical safety margins (min) and critical locations  
 Pub TRL BE  RD 
Scenario 1 87 (B) 290 (A) 379 (E) 12 (G) 
Scenario 2 87 (B) 261 (F) 379 (E)  11 (G) 
Scenario 3 87 (B) 290 (A) 379 (E) 166 (D) 
Scenario 4 87 (B) 261 (F) 379 (E) 167 (D) 
 
Thus of all four scenarios, Scenario 3 offers the greatest margin of safety for most 
people, even though it results in the longest assembly time and the longest travel 
distance for the population of the RD.  Without the use of coupled fire and evacuation 
modelling this result may not have been immediately apparent as it is somewhat counter 
intuitive i.e. preferred option involves longest assembly time and greatest travel 
distance for RD residents.   
 
The safety margins also provide a basis on which to prioritise the warning sequence for 
the occupants in the various establishments. In the preferred Scenario 3, the population 
with the shortest safety margin are the occupants of the Pub followed by the occupants 
of the RD and TRL and finally the BE.  Thus if resources are limited, it would be 
essential to warn the occupants of the Pub first followed by the RD.  
5.5.4 Congestion on Evacuation Routes 
Relatively small amounts of congestion was experienced on the evacuation routes in all 
scenarios. Since the evacuation took place on roads which were at least 4 meters wide, 
there was not much congestion experienced by the agents in any of the scenarios. 
Furthermore, the agents from the different establishments reached the main exit routes 
at slightly different times reducing the likelihood of generating high congestion levels. 
The percentage of time spent by the agents in congestion compared to their overall 
evacuation time for all scenarios is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Percentage of the time agents spent in congestion compared to their 
overall evacuation time 
 Scenario 1 (%) Scenario 2 (%) Scenario 3 (%) Scenario 4 (%) 
TRL 7.2 5.7 7.2 5.7 
BE 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 
Pub 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.6 
 
The agents from TRL experience the greatest levels of congestion for all scenarios with 
Scenarios 1 and 3 producing the most severe conditions when they take the direct route 
to the assembly area. However, when they use the path that takes them through the BE 
the levels of congestion they encounter are lower due to the fact that their evacuation 
takes longer and have longer time to spread on the evacuation route. However, in the 
worst cases of Scenarios 1 and 3 they only waste 7.2% of their travel time in congestion. 
The agents from the BE experience very low levels of congestion 1.2% for Scenarios 1 
and 3 and 1.3% for Scenarios 2 and 4. This is due to the fact that the relatively fewer 
agents (200 in total) are distributed in several buildings within the estate. Therefore, 
there is little chance for congestion to build up along the evacuation route. Conversely, 
the same number of agents that are located in the Pub experience higher levels of 
congestion at 5.7% for Scenarios 1 and 3 and 5.6% for Scenarios 2 and 4. This is due 
to these agents exiting from one small building and utilising a single short path (0.8 
km) to the assembly area. The agents originating from the RD did not experience any 
congestion in any of the scenarios.  
5.6 Reviewing simulation results in webEXODUS during emergency response 
The version of EXODUS used in the above analysis, which is equivalent to the planning 
and preparation phase of an emergency was urbanEXODUS. During the emergency 
response phase, the incident strategic commanders require a more mobile and easier to 
use version of the evacuation simulation tool. In these applications the webEXODUS 
interface can be used by operators with little or no knowledge of evacuation simulation 
software to analyse evacuation procedures during a developing incident. webEXODUS 
can be accessed over the internet allowing field commanders to specify simulation 
inputs using a browser, run simulations on the EXODUS engine located on a remote 
server and view the simulation results. A single aspect of the webEXODUS 
functionality namely the ability to replay the simulation results on a web browser is 
shown in Figure 14.  The main purpose of this functionality is to allow the user to step 
through the simulation to gain an understanding of how the pedestrian evacuation is 
projected to progress during the incident. These figures show snapshots of the 
simulation progress for one randomly selected simulation from the 10 repeat 
simulations for Scenario 1 at 10 min, 30 min, 60 min and 91 min. Though it is possible 
to show the evacuation simulation progress at 10 s time steps, these key time steps have 
been chosen for discussion in this section as they correspond to time step used in the 
fire model. 
 
There are three main sections in the webEXODUS interface used to view the simulation 
progress as a time stepped animation.  The main body consists of the base map and the 
population density overlays. The base map shown is the OpenStreetMap. However, 
other base map layers can be selected including various versions of Google Maps. The 
population density contour is seen as dots at the assembly location and at the 
highlighted (circled) locations. The dots are cells measuring 36 m2 (6 X 6 meters) and 
their colour represents a heat map based on the density of the agents contained in the 
cell (e.g. hotter colour, red, for higher densities and cooler colour, blue, for lower 
densities). The reason behind the selection of this size is based upon the assumption 
that group behaviour is best observed at this size (Pretorius et al., 2013). The critical 
locations A, B, C and E are shown as lines on the map labelled accordingly. These lines 
or critical locations are interactive in that they can be clicked on to bring up a popup 
showing the total number of agents that have cleared the location during the entire 
simulation and the number of agents that have cleared them at the current time.   
 
The snapshot in Figure 14a was captured at 10 min after fire ignition i.e. the start of the 
evacuation. The fire data is provided at approximately 30 minute time steps and hence 
there is no fire data available at this time. The footer of this interface contains the 
controls to step through the evacuation simulation. The simulation time, the number of 
agents that have reached the assembly location and number still evacuating is also 
shown. If there are any predicted fatalities or agents trapped in the simulation due to a 
loss of viable escape route they can also be depicted. In this simulation at 10 min, all 
the agents in the Pub have cleared critical location B and 14 of them have already 
assembled with the rest on their way to the assembly location. Agents from TRL and 
BE are clearing safe locations A and E and are heading towards to the assembly 
location.  At this time only 14 agents have assembled, with 1206 yet to reach the 
assembly location. 
 
  
(a) Simulation progress at 10 min (b) Simulation progress at 30 min 
  
(c) Simulation progress at 60 min (d) Hazard (smoke and fire) fronts at 91 min 
Figure 14: webEXODUS user interface showing progress of evacuation and 
hazard front at various times 
The simulation progress at 30 min is shown in Figure 14b. The fire is still small and is 
not considered to be a threat to the evacuating population. All the agents from the pub 
have assembled. At this time, 491 agents from TRL have reached the assembly location 
with the remainder of the TRL population walking along the South Road. The BE 
agents are walking along the Nine Mile Ride Road.  At this time 691 agents have 
assembled, with 529 yet to reach the assembly location. 
 
The simulation progress at 1 hr is shown in Error! Reference source not found.Figure 
14c. Only a handful of agents have not reached the assembly location and are still 
walking along the South Road. Though the fire front and projected smoke front has now 
spread closer to the A3095 Road, all the agents are now clear of the advancing front 
and can be considered to be safe. At this time only 1208 agents have assembled, with 
only 12 yet to reach the assembly location. 
 
The extent of the hazard front at 30, 60 and 91 min after ignition are shown in Figure 
13d. The figure demonstrates how the critical locations and safety margins are 
determined.  In this work the hazard front is considered to be 250 m ahead of the fire 
front.  Thus by knowing the location of the fire front at a point in time, the location of 
the hazard front, ahead of the fire front can be determined.  At 30 min it is clear that the 
fire front is far away from A3095, but the hazard smoke front is some 250 m ahead of 
the fire front and so is within 45 m of the road.  Thus while the hazard front is 
approaching the A3095, the road is still considered passable at this time.   
 
The last of the agents from the RD passes the point marked on the A3095 at 45 min. 
Based on the fire model predictions, the hazard front crosses the A3095 sometime 
between 30 min and 60 min.  The location at which the hazard front crosses the A3095 
could be considered a critical location and this is likely to occur sometime between 30 
min and 60 min which may impact the agents from the RD.  However, as the fire hazard 
data was only available in 30 min time steps it was not possible to identify the critical 
location on the A3095 and hence it was not possible to determine if the agents from the 
RD are considered safe at 45 min.  The last of the RD agents reaches critical location 
G at 48 min 6sand critical location C at 54 min.  At 60 min the hazard front has covered 
part of the A3095 but the last of the RD agents have reached critical location C by 54 
min and so have cleared the threatened part of the A3095.  At 60 min, the hazard front 
is predicted to have reached the vicinity of critical location G. As the last of the agents 
from the RD cleared this point at 48 min, the safety factor for the RD determined at 
critical location G is 12 min (60 min - 48 min). Similarly, at 91 min, the hazard front is 
predicted to have reached the vicinity of critical location C. As the last of the agents 
from the RD cleared this point at 54 min, the safety factor for the RD determined at 
critical location C is 37 min (91 min - 54 min).  Thus on this route, the hazard front 
follows the RD agents during their evacuation.   Assuming that the RD agents are safely 
through the hazardous region when the hazard front reaches the road (possibly at around 
45 min), the RD agents are able to stay ahead of the advancing hazard front but must 
keep moving without reducing their travel speeds. 
 
6 Limitations and further work 
Urban scale evacuation simulation is still in its infancy and so the software presented 
in this paper should not be considered a finished product but a prototype.  More work 
is required both in the development of the software tools and in understanding and 
quantifying the behaviour and performance of people subjected to large-scale disasters.  
Several important limitations of the work presented in this paper include: 
 Understanding and quantifying the response phase behaviour of people (Galea, 
2009, Galea et al., 2013 and Galea et al., 2017) in large-scale urban evacuation 
situations is critical to the validity of urban scale evacuation simulation models.  
The response phase behaviour is likely to be different for different types of 
hazardous situations such as wildfire, flood, earthquake and tsunami.  
Furthermore, this is likely to be culturally and situation dependent (Galea et al., 
2013), with people in Hafia Israel potentially behaving differently to a wildfire 
compared to people in Australia and people in a remote homestead in Australia 
potentially reacting differently to people in a large urban conurbation in 
Australia.  Other factors such as experience of previous events, training, 
severity of the perceived threat, prior warning, type of prior warning, social 
bonds are also expected to exert an influence on response behaviour.  The 
authors are involved in a Horizon 2020 Marie Curie project called GEO-SAFE 
(Fire Safety Engineering Group, 2016) which intends to collect data concerning 
response phase behaviour of people subjected to the threat of wildfire in both 
Europe and Australia which will provide some insight into this issue.  Until 
such data is collected, sensitivity analysis should be undertaken to estimate the 
impact of response behaviours on model predictions. 
 Physical walking capabilities of pedestrians over long distances (possibly 
several kilometres), the impact of fatigue and the impact of terrain type, 
including steepness of grade and nature of surface e.g. paved, gravel, grassy, 
etc, must be represented within urban scale evacuation simulation models.  This 
extends not just to the physical capabilities of the population but also how the 
different terrain types can be identified and represented within the geometry of 
the simulation model.  Within the simulations presented in this paper, both 
fatigue and the nature of the terrain was not represented.  Thus the results 
presented in this paper should be considered ‘optimistic’.  In collaboration with 
colleagues in France, ISMANS (Fire Safety Engineering Group 2015a) and 
Italy, Corpo Nazionale Dei Vigili Del Fuoco (Vigili del Fuoco Comando 
Perugia, 2016), the authors have started to collect human performance data to 
address this need.   
 Large-scale evacuation situations are unlikely to be performed solely by 
pedestrians on foot.  Road vehicle traffic is a likely component of most urban 
scale evacuation situations.  Road vehicles are likely to be used as a means of 
population evacuation and may even have an impact on the evacuation of 
pedestrians.  In addition, vehicles will be used to dispatch first responders such 
as fire fighters to where they are needed and, as in the simulations presented in 
this paper, provide a means of communicating the need to evacuate to scattered 
members of the population by dispatching police officers.  As part of the IDIRA 
project (IDIRA end user comments, 2013) the evacuation simulation 
environment presented in this paper was extensively tested by organisations 
involved in disaster management who reported that the system was both user 
friendly and a useful decision support tool for large scale disasters. The major 
limitation that was identified was the omission of a representation of vehicles 
within the simulation environment. Clearly, it is desirable to include within 
urban scale evacuation simulation models a capability to not only represent 
vehicles, as several models already do (Gulam and Rahim, 2004, Singh et al, 
2016  and Halati et al., 2017), but to allow the interaction between vehicles and 
pedestrians. To address this limitation, the authors have embarked on a research 
project to include the representation of road vehicles within agent based 
pedestrian evacuation simulation.   
 Clearly, if urban scale evacuation simulation is to be used not only for planning 
but as part of a decision support tool for incident managers, the software must 
be able to perform simulations much faster than real time.  For the size of the 
population represented in these simulations (1220 people) and for the size of 
space represented (1.58 km2), the EXODUS engine was found to be capable of 
simulating the evacuation  about 20 times faster than real time using a standard 
PC computer.  This type of performance, and better, is required for populations 
not measured in one or two thousand, but in the tens and hundreds of thousands 
and areas measuring tens or hundreds of square kilometres.  It is suggested that 
further improvements in performance could be achieved using the parallel 
implementation of the EXODUS engine (Grandison et al., 2017) and with the 
use of more powerful PC computers. 
 Wildfire fire simulation tools such as Prometheus (Tymstra et al. 2010) and 
Phoenix (Tolhurst et al. 2008) currently only provide an estimation of the 
location of the fire front.  They do not also provide information related to the 
movement, optical density and composition of fire smoke.  Knowledge of the 
presence and concentration of fire smoke is vital for evacuation in wildfires as 
smoke is likely to make evacuation routes non-tenable long before the flaming 
fire front. Further development of wildfire fire simulation tools is therefore 
required before the coupled fire-evacuation analysis can be truly useful as part 
of the real time decision support tool for incident managers.     
 Calculation of the safety margins associated with each population and 
evacuation route is currently a laborious manual process requiring the running 
of many coupled fire and evacuation simulations to identify potential critical 
locations and as such is prone to error.  The process of identifying critical 
locations and safety margins can be automated ensuring that all critical 
locations associated with evacuation routes are identified and all safety factors 
computed.   
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presents a prototype software system that has been developed to evaluate 
evacuation procedures during the preparation (urbanEXODUS) and emergency 
response phases (webEXODUS) of a large scale incident such as a wildfire. The 
software makes use of open source geospatial vector data (OSM XML) to generate a 
virtual representation of the physical space through which pedestrian based evacuation 
occurs.  Free and open source web and GIS software is used to develop the web 
interface which is used to establish a remote connection with the EXODUS engine and 
integrate with a state-of-the-art web based disaster management system to produce a 
Common Operating Picture for disaster managers.  Furthermore, the software was 
loosely coupled to the forest fire simulation software Prometheus enabling the potential 
impact of the fire on the evacuation to be evaluated. 
 
The simulation tool was demonstrated by simulating the evacuation of part of Bracknell 
UK which was affected by the Swinley fires of 2011. The software, coupled with the 
output from the Prometheus wildfire simulation software, was used to evaluate four 
possible evacuation scenarios associated with hypothetical wind changes that could 
have impacted the fire development during the actual fires.  The analysis determined 
the time required to evacuate the threatened population to a place of safety, the distances 
travelled by the population, levels of congestion incurred during the evacuation and the 
safety margins associated with each population centre in each scenario.  The analysis 
identified that two of the scenarios would result in very small safety margins associated 
with the evacuation of occupants from threatened residential dwellings.  The optimal 
scenario, which resulted in maximum safety margins for all threatened sub-populations 
was counter intuitive in that it resulted in the maximum assembly time and the longest 
travel distances for the occupants of the residential dwellings.  Use of the software also 
confirmed the viability of the identified assembly area, prioritised the alerting of the at-
risk populations and assisted in prioritising the tasks of the emergency services.   
 
The work demonstrates that the integration of fire simulation with evacuation 
simulation enables the estimation of safety margins associated with alternative 
evacuation strategies and thereby assists incident managers in planning phased 
evacuation strategies. Most importantly, the quantification of safety margins associated 
with evacuation choices assists incident managers to more reliably select the most 
appropriate evacuation strategy for the evolving situation.  The system can be 
extrapolated to other emergencies such as those associated with floods and earthquakes 
or manmade terrorist situations.  Additional research is required to improve the 
applicability and reliability of urban scale agent based evacuation simulation including, 
improving our understanding and quantification of; response phase behaviour, walking 
behaviour of pedestrians over long distances and different types of terrain, the 
representation of vehicles and their interaction with pedestrians, the representation of 
smoke in wildfire simulations and the speed and performance of large scale agent based 
simulation models.   
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